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Abstract. In this paper authors examine the effects of ownership status and exporting activity on the like-
lihood of survival for firms operating in the Italian manufacturing during the recent economic crisis. In 
particular, they aim to answer the following two main questions: What is the direct impact of being an 
exporter or a multinational enterprise (both domestic and foreign) on the likelihood of Italian firm surviv-
al? Do globally engaged firms react to the severity of the economic crisis differently from national-non 
exporter firms?  
Using an original database for the period 2002-2010 and estimating a conditional Probit model based on a 
wide range of relevant variables, we find strong evidence that during the recent global crisis exporting 
firms exhibit lower exiting rates than non exporting ones, while domestic multinationals have higher exit 
risks than those of domestic firms. Also, affiliates of foreign firms do not behave differently from national 
firms. 
Keywords: financial crisis, trade, multinational firms, firm exit. 
Jel classification: C41, F1, F23, L2 
 
1. Introduction 
The inadequate performance of financial and real 
markets after the 2008 global crisis has led to lim-
ited entry of new firms and higher firm exit. This 
framework provides a kind of ideal natural ex-
periment to investigate firm survival. 
The specific contribution of this paper is to 
investigate whether Italian firms engaged in global 
markets by exports and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) exhibited different survival performance in 
the recent crisis with respect to firms not involved 
in these activities. 
The analysis of the determinants of firm sur-
vival has long been a key objective of research in 
different fields. The specific role of access to for-
eign markets, both through exports and FDI, is at 
the core of a rising recent literature on firm sur-
vival (Greenaway et al. 2008; Wagner 2011). 
Some recent papers have also found evidence that 
globally engaged firms exhibit lower sensitivity to 
financial constraints than purely domestic firms 
(Guariglia, Mateut 2005; Blalock et al. 2008; 
Greenaway et al. 2007; Bridges, Guariglia 2008; 
Görg, Spaliara 2009). 
However, quite few studies have tried to ad-
dress how global engagement influences firm per-
formances in the context of an economic slow-
down. This scant literature has mostly focused on 
the role that foreign multinationals (FMNEs) play 
in an economic crisis and is mostly based on the 
Asian financial crisis (McAleese, Counahan 1979; 
Desai et al. 2004; Desai et al. 2008) or on past 
country specific slowdowns such as in Chile at the 
end of the 1990s (Alvarez, Görg 2011) and in Por-
tugal in the early 1990s and 2000s (Varum, Ro-
cha 2011). To the best of our knowledge only 
three recent studies have focused on the behaviour 
of foreign investors in the recent global crisis in a 
cross national framework (Tong, Wei 2010; Al-
faro, Chen 2011) and, as an example for Ireland, at 
national level (Godart et al. 2011). However, an 
overlooked issue in this literature is the behaviour 
of exporters and domestic multinationals 
(DMNEs) in a crisis context. 
The first contribution of our paper is to fill 
this void in the literature focusing on the exit be-
haviour of firms which are exporters or multina-
tional enterprises (both DMNEs and FMNEs) 
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within the context of the recent international crisis. 
The second contribution of this study is to deepen-
ing a rising firm level literature on the impact of 
the international crisis on Italian firms. So far, em-
pirical evidence has explored the impact of firm 
size and export propensity (Bugamelli et al. 2009), 
of product and process innovation (Antonioli et al 
2011) and of firm labour cost adjustment processes 
(Cingano et al. 2010; Fabiani, Sabbatini 2011) on 
firm growth over the crisis. 
We use an original database, obtained by 
matching and merging three firm-level datasets: 
Capitalia, AIDA and Mint-Italy. The empirical 
analysis is carried out in two steps. Firstly, we de-
scribe the statistical differences in the likelihood of 
survival comparing different firm characteristics 
between the sample of firms which do not fail over 
the whole period (2004-2010), with two other 
groups: the firms which exit between 2004 and 
2008, and those which exit over 2008-2010, i.e. 
during the global crisis. Secondly, using a Probit 
model we estimate the determinants of firms’ 
probability of failing before the crisis and after it, 
as effect of firm internationalisation (exports, in-
ward and outward FDI), controlling for a wide set 
of other variables at firm level (size, age, produc-
tivity, innovation, financial constraints such as 
profit margin, collateral, solvency ratio and debt 
with banks over turnover) and at industry level 
(technological intensity of the sectors using a 
Pavitt taxonomy, international specialisation).  
We find different characteristics for surviving 
and exiting firms before and after the crisis shock. 
More specifically, our results show that during the 
crisis exporters perform much better than non ex-
porters, while DMNEs are more likely to exit than 
domestic firms and FMNEs show a pattern not 
significantly different with respect to national 
firms. As for the other firm characteristics, we find 
mixed results with respect to our a priori. On the 
one hand, we find evidence that financial health 
and innovation performances matter during the 
crisis: surviving firms have higher collateral and 
solvency, are less indebted with the banks and be-
long to a high technology sector (according to 
Pavitt taxonomy and with respect to the reference 
category of specialised suppliers). Conversely, we 
find that unexpectedly the higher firm size and age 
do not reduce exit probabilities during the crisis, 
unlike before it. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 
2 we lay out the theoretical background and the 
research hypotheses. In section 3 we sketch out the 
dataset construction, some descriptive statistics 
and the variables used. Finally, in section 4 we 
analyse the econometric methodology and present 
our results.  
2. Globally engaged firms and survival during 
an economic slowdown: a brief survey 
In the recent literature on firm survival, export ac-
tivities and international production are the most 
debated factors. However, despite there is now a 
wide theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between firm global activities and 
firm performance (Görg, Strobl 2003; Kimura, 
Fujii 2003; Bernard, Sjöholm 2003; Ozler, Tay-
maz 2004; Esteve Pérez et al. 2004; Alvarez, 
Görg 2009; Ferragina et al. 2010; Ferragina et al. 
2011) there are still few investigations on how the-
se relationships work during an economic slow-
down.  
Why should we expect that globally engaged 
firms behave differently in the context of an eco-
nomic slowdown?  
a) To be exporter during an economic slowdown 
Following the New-New Trade Theory exporting 
firms are more productive, have higher technolog-
ical, managerial and human capabilities and, there-
fore, have higher capacity to face adverse external 
conditions (Melitz 2003). Besides, exporting can 
be considered as a form of risk diversification 
through spread of sales over different markets with 
different business cycle conditions or in a different 
phase of the product cycle. Therefore, exports 
might provide a chance to substitute sales at home 
by sales abroad when a negative demand shock 
hits the home market and would force a firm to 
close down otherwise. However, there are also 
reasons to expect exporters to be more vulnerable 
to the negative effects of an economic crisis, espe-
cially if this is global and does not allow to take 
advantage of different market conditions. For in-
stance, exporters might be especially affected by 
higher sunk costs and be more concentrated on 
economies of scale and as such less flexible in 
adapting to an economic downturn. Furthermore, 
they might be more reliant on credit and bank 
lending and they might be paying higher interest 
rates. As a result the predictions are ambiguous: 
exporting firms might be more able to sustain their 
survival and employment level and counteract the 
negative effects of the crisis, helping to stabilize 
the economy, but on the contrary they might also 
be more vulnerable. The empirical evidence on 
these matters is still scarce and concentrated on the 
context of the East Asian financial crisis 
(Sato 2000; ter Wengel, Rodriguez 2006). 
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b) To be multinational during an economic 
slowdown 
There are ambiguous a priori also on the way 
MNEs react to an economic shock. Why should 
we expect a different behaviour from multination-
als with respect to domestic firms? First of all, 
MNEs have access to both internal and interna-
tional financial markets, which allows them to di-
versify their sources of financing and the associ-
ated risks and also allows foreign affiliates to be 
less dependent on host capital markets in their op-
erations as they may obtain credit from their mul-
tinational parents. This is crucial especially under 
a credit tight imposed by global financial crisis. 
Secondly, because MNEs enjoy less bankruptcy 
risk and adopt international standards in terms of 
product quality, they find it easier to gain access to 
domestic banks (Colombo 2001; Harrison, 
McMillan 2003). Thirdly, there is the argument of 
substantial sunk costs of entry into foreign market 
and even more of investing abroad, and the strong 
investment in long-term relationships and accumu-
lation of firm-specific skills in foreign markets, 
which may also explain why MNEs are unlikely to 
reply aggressively to short term changes in host 
country conditions and be more able to adapt 
themselves to the hostile environment. However, 
there are also reasons to expect MNEs to be more 
reactive to the negative effects of an economic 
crisis, and therefore, act as “unstabilising agents”. 
In the case of multinationals, these can move pro-
duction facilities easily between different countries 
(the “footloose behaviour” hypothesis). 
There is a certain amount of empirical evi-
dence on the specific reaction of foreign firms in 
terms of both exit behaviour and growth patterns. 
According to the role played by MNEs, these stud-
ies can be summarized into three different groups, 
which respectively find: 1) a stabilising role 2) a 
destabilising role; 3) no evidence of a (de) stabilis-
ing role (see table 1). 
A discrete number of studies find that MNEs 
exhibit a better reaction to crises than domestic 
firms (stabilising role). Many of them stress upon 
the financial issues. Desai et al. (2004) show that 
multinational affiliates substitute internal borrow-
ing for costly external finance when facing adverse 
capital market conditions. In a more recent paper, 
Desai et al. (2008) also find that US multinationals 
located in emerging markets increase operations 
more than domestic firms in the presence of a cur-
rency crisis and they argue that this is due to mul-
tinationals being less financially constrained than 
domestic firms. 
 
Table 1. Literature on the potential impact of foreign 
MNEs and SMEs exporting firms over a crisis 
Results References 
FMNEs as  
“stabilizing” agents 
Fukao 2001; Athukorala 2003; 
Wang et al. 2005; Blalock et 
al. 2005; Chung et al. 2005; 
Narioko et al. 2007; Desai et al  
2004 ; Desai et al  2008; Alfaro 
et al. 2011; Tong et al. 2010 
FMNEs as  
“unstabilising” agents 
Flamm 1984; Lipsey 2001; Gorg 
et al. 2003; Alvarez et al. 2009 
No evidence of a 
(de)stabilizing role of 
FMNEs 
McAleese et al. 1979; Varum et 
al. 2011; Alvarez et al. 2011; 
Godart et al. 2011 
Exporting SMEs bet-
ter able to adjust  
Sato 2000; ter Wengel et al. 2006 
 
Blalock et al. (2008) show that after the 1997 East 
Asian financial crisis Indonesian exporters with 
foreign ownership were able to significantly in-
crease their investment, while domestically owned 
exporting firms were unable to do so due to fi-
nancing constraints. Focusing on the recent crisis 
with data on 3,823 firms in 24 emerging countries, 
Tong and Wei (2010) find that exposure to FDI 
alleviated liquidity constraints. Fukao (2001) and 
Wang et al. (2005) emphasise the role of substan-
tial sunk costs in investing abroad in addition to 
investment, long-term relationships and accumula-
tion of firm-specific skills as the reason why for-
eign firms are unlikely to reply aggressively to 
short term changes in host country conditions. Al-
varez et al. (2011) point to the same conclusion in 
their investigation of the response of multinational 
and domestic firms to an economic downturn in 
Chile: lower employment reductions over the eco-
nomic crisis with respect to domestic firms (al-
though they are more likely to exit).  
A less optimistic view on multinational behav-
iour over a crisis (destabilising role) is supported 
by few studies (Flamm 1984; Lipsey 2001; Gorg, 
Strobl 2003; Alvarez, Gorg 2009), which suggest 
that foreign firms introduce higher volatility in the 
host economy because they move production fa-
cilities easily between different countries (the 
“footloose behaviour” hypothesis).  
Finally, there is a third group of studies that do 
not find any particular difference in the behaviour 
of MNEs compared to domestic firms during a 
slowdoun. McAleese and Counahan (1979) for 
Ireland do not find any difference in employment 
adjustment between multinational and domestic 
firms during a recession. Varum e Rocha (2011) 
examine firm employment and turnover growth 
over 20 years focusing on economic downturns in 
Portugal and find no significant differences be-
tween domestic and foreign firms. Godart et al. 
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(2011) also find that foreign firms are not more 
likely to leave during the recent crisis than Irish 
firms.  
To sum up, we may conclude that so far the 
largest empirical evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that foreign multinationals are less af-
fected by an economic crisis and that they are able 
to act as stabilizer in an economy, while there is 
less support for the footloose behaviour of foreign 
multinationals in a crisis.  
3. Data, variables and preliminary empirics 
In this section we present the dataset (section 3.1), 
the variables specifications and the theoretical a 
priori with respect to them (section 3.2) and some 
descriptive statistics (section 3.3). 
3.1. Dataset construction  
The empirical analysis included in this paper has 
been conducted using a firm level database for the 
period 2002-2009 resulting from the intersection 
of three different sources: IXth Survey on Manu-
facturing Firms by Capitalia/Unicredit, AIDA 
(Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende) and Mint-
Italy, by Bureau Van Dyck.  
The IXth Capitalia survey provides micro evi-
dence about manufacturing companies and covers 
the period 2001-2003. This survey has been run in 
2004 through questionnaires distributed to a sample 
of 4289 firms with more than 10 employees. How-
ever, this database presents two drawbacks. Firstly, 
most of Capitalia questions refer to the entire three-
year period, rather than to each year. Secondly, it 
does not provide data on a wide set of financial var-
iables useful for the analysis. Given the limits above 
mentioned, additional information useful for the 
aim of the paper come from the rich firm level da-
tabase AIDA. AIDA collects annual accounts of 
Italian corporate enterprises and contains infor-
mation on a wide set of economic and financial var-
iables such as sales, costs and number of employ-
ees, value added, fixed tangible assets, start-up year, 
as well as legal and ownership status.  
Variables about internationalization activity of 
firms are drawn from AIDA, Capitalia and Mint-
Italy. In particular, using the ownership status 
variable in AIDA we define domestic multination-
als (DMNEs) as non foreign-owned firms with a 
share of direct ownership greater/ equal to 10 per-
cent in firms located in countries other than Italy 
and foreign multinationals (FMNEs) as Italian 
firms whose Global Ultimate owner is foreign. In-
formation related to the export activity of the firms 
is drawn from a merger between Capitalia and 
Mint-Italy. This latter is a firm level database of 
Italian companies, banks and insurance companies 
with variables on export and import activities. 
More specifically, the merger between Capitalia 
and Mint-Italy allowed us to identify the firms in 
the sample that were exporters over the period 
2002-2009.  
The legal status (i.e. active, into liquidation, 
bankruptcy or inactive) allows us to identify the 
exit of the firm. In this way, we have identified all 
firms in the Capitalia dataset (with info in 2001-
2003) still alive on January 1st 2008 and we have 
matched them with AIDA information obtaining 
4066 firms (that is 94.8 per cent of the Capitalia 
sample, which includes 4289 firms). Likewise, we 
have identified firms inactive after the crisis peri-
od, i.e. firms inactive on January 1st 2010 and, in 
the same way, firms which survived over 2008-
2010. This kind of dataset is a catch-up panel, 
where a cross-sectional data set is chosen at some 
time in the past and then the units of analysis are 
located in the present by subsequent observations. 
3.2. Variables specification and expected signs 
Following the literature on the determinats of firm 
survival, in this section we describe the specifica-
tion and the expected sign of a wide set of vari-
ables which we use in our empirical analysis 
(more details are shown in table 2). 
More specifically, we use the following set of 
variables: 
 
1) Internationalisation variables; 
2) Firm structure and performance variables; 
3) Firm financial variables; 
4) Innovation variables. 
 
1) Internationalisation variables 
 
• EXPORT is the export dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if firm i is an exporter and 0 
otherwise; 
• OUTFDI is the domestic multinational owner-
ship dummy that takes a value of 1 if firm i is 
an Italian owned MNE and 0 otherwise; 
• INWFDI is the foreign multinational owner-
ship dummy that takes a value of one 1 if firm 
i is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. 
Following the literature surveyed in section 2, the 
expected results are ambiguous. We have also 
considered: 
 
• SPEC which is a dummy that takes a value of 
one if the 3 digit Ateco Lafay index of spe-
cialisation is greater than 0 and 0 otherwise. 
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2) Firm structure and performance variables 
 
• SIZE is given by the number of employees. It 
is a stylized fact from many empirical studies 
that the likelihood of firm exit declines with 
firm size measured by the number of employ-
ees (Dunne et al. 1989; Mata, Portugal 1994). 
There are several reasons suggesting a nega-
tive relationship between firm size and the 
probability of exit. A small size can be inter-
preted as a proxy variable for a number of un-
observed firm characteristics, including disad-
vantages of scale, higher restrictions on the 
capital market and in access to labour markets, 
leading to a higher risk of insolvency and il-
liquidity for small firms, competition for 
highly qualified employees, and lower talent 
of management.  
• AGE is defined as the difference between year 
t and the official year of incorporation of the 
firm. Since older firms are more likely to pos-
sess a bundle of characteristics that have 
helped them to prevent exit in the past, we ex-
pect that have a lower chance to exit. This is 
coherent with selection models (Jovanovic 
1982), where firms go through a process of 
learning about their relative efficiency and 
market competitiveness, and in line with a 
large number of empirical papers which have 
shown that younger firms are more likely to 
fail (e.g., Mata et al. 1994; Audretsch, Mah-
mood 1995; Disney et al. 2003). 
• PROD is labour productivity, namely net val-
ue added per employee. Since several theoreti-
cal models describing the dynamics of indus-
tries with heterogeneous firms (Jovanovic 
1982; Hopenhayn 1992) predict that the exit of 
firms is motivated to a large extent by produc-
tivity differences at the firm level, we expect 
that the survival rates of firms are higher with-
in more productive firms. 
 
 
3) Financial variables 
 
• PROFIT is the operating margin on total sales. 
Higher profits reduce exiters, while lower 
profits stimulate the decision to exit; so we 
expect a positive impact of the operating profit 
ratio on the likelihood of survival. 
• SOLVENCY defines the solvency ratio 
(shareholder's funds/total assets), which is an 
indicator of the liquid assets of the firm. We 
expect to find that more solvent firms face a 
lower likelihood of failure. 
 
Table 2. Definition of variables, data sources and  
expected relationships 
Category Variables Description Source Exp. sign 
St
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Size 
Firm size measured by 
the number of employ-
ees. 
Aida - 
Age 
Firm age measured by 
the number of years 
since establishment. 
Aida - 
Prod 
Firm productivity meas-
ured by value added per 
employee 
Aida - 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l  
va
ria
bl
es
  
Profit Firm profit before tax over turnover (%) Aida - 
Solvency 
Company's post-tax net 
profit and depreciation 
divided by the quantity 
of long-term and short-
term liabilities (%) 
Aida - 
Collateral 
Firm ratio of its tangible 
assets to its total assets 
(%,) 
Aida - 
Debts 
banks  
Firm short and long term 
debts with banks over 
turnover (%) 
 
Aida + 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
lis
at
io
n 
  
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Inwfdi 
Foreign ownership 
dummy that takes on the 
value 1 if the firm is 
foreign-owned, 0 other-
wise 
Aida +/- 
Outfdi 
Domestic multinational 
ownership dummy that 
takes on  the value 1 if 
the firm is an  Italian 
owned-MNE, 0 other-
wise. 
Aida 
 +/- 
Export 
Dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the firm exports 
over the entire period 
Mint-
Italy - 
Spec 
Dummy =1 if 3 digit 
Ateco Lafay index of 
specialisation > 0 oth-
erwise =0 
OECD - 
In
no
va
tio
n 
va
ria
bl
es
 
RD 
R&D intensity defined 
as the ratio of R&D 
expenditure on sales 
Aida +/- 
Pavitt 
PAVITT p-1 macrosector 
dummies (p=1,..,4) for 
firms belonging to Tra-
ditional (1), Specialised 
(2), Scale (3) and High-
Tech (4) industries 
Capitalia +/- 
Fu
rth
er
  
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
 
Location 
dummy 
 
Dummy = 1 for firms  
located in Southern 
areas* and 0 otherwise. 
Aida  
Ateco 
sectors 
2 digit Ateco 2002 clas-
sification Istat  
 
• COLLATERAL, given by the ratio of firm 
tangible assets to its total assets, is expected to 
have an important impact in terms of lowering 
failure probabilities. 
• DEBTS BANKS can be associated with a 
worse balance sheet situation, increasing 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
Hence, we should expect a positive relation-
ship between higher leverage and the probabil-
ity of exit as some empirical studies have 
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found (Becchetti et al. 2002; Bunn et al. 2003; 
Fotopoulos et al. 2000; Vartia 2004; Bridges 
et al. 2008). On the other hand, as a high rate 
of leverage can also be seen as an indicator of 
a good credit standing and high borrowing ca-
pacity of firms, we expect an ambiguous sign 
between leverage and the probability of exit. 
 
4) Innovation variables 
 
• R&D (research & development intensity) is 
defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure on 
sales. According to the resource-based litera-
ture (Barney et al. 2001), the chances of sur-
vival greatly depend on the ability of firms to 
develop specific capabilities, which in turn 
may be improved by investing in R&D. How-
ever, R&D activities are usually associated 
with uncertainty and so firms investing in re-
search may suffer a higher failure risk.  
• PAVITT are four macrosector dummies which 
indicate clusters of innovation at industry 
level. Previous work examining survival con-
ditions of new entrants at the industry level 
(Audretsch et al. 1995; Audretsch et al. 2000) 
have found exit rates to be greater in R&D in-
tensive industries given that the competition 
environment is tougher. However, Kimura and 
Fujii (2003) have found that R&D activities 
raise firms’ survival probabilities.  
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 contains the mean of our sets of variables 
distinguished by three groups of firms: a) firms 
which do not fail over the whole period 
(2004-2010), b) firms which exit before the crisis 
(2004-2008), and c) firms which exit during the 
crisis (2008-2010).  
Statistically comparing the mean differences 
for our variables of interest related to global en-
gagement, we see that while surviving firm are 
more likely to be globally engaged via exports 
(more than 50 %) than their failed counterparts 
over both periods (only 4 and 2 % on average are 
exporters respectively within the two groups of 
failed firms), subsidiaries of foreign firms are less 
likely to exit before the crisis but they have not a 
significantly different probability of exiting than 
domestic owned firms over the crisis. Domestic 
multinationals indeed are more likely to exit be-
fore the crisis while they also have not a signifi-
cantly different probability than domestic non 
multinational firms over the crisis. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics: variable means (2007)  
 
Sur-
viving 
firms 
Firms 
exited 
over 
2002-
2007 
Firms 
exited 
over 
2008-
2010 
Diff 
mean 
test 
Diff 
mean 
test 
Diff 
mean 
test 
N=3696 N=89 N=281    
(0) (1) (2) (0)-(1) (0)-(2) (1)-(2) 
Age 28.99 23.19 26.17 3.49a 2.91a -1.68 
Size 144.27 28.97 113.57 1.89b 1.05 -2.74 
Prod 61650 21264 31235 3.49a 7.43a -0.65 
RD 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.49 -0.81 -0.87 
Profit 4.01 -51.05 -21.29 9.09a 9.30a -1.25 
Collateral 0.76 0.62 0.7 3.31a 3.13a -1.4 
Debts 
banks  22.87 7.15 28.68 3.32a -3.30a -3.84a 
Solvency 28.86 37.80 19.72 -2.34a 5.74a 2.84a 
Export 0.51 0.04 0.02 8.81a 16.43a 1.19 
Inwfdi 0.92 0.99 0.92 -2.42b -0.19 2.29b 
Outfdi 0.04 0 0.02 1.89c 1.47 -1.39 
Spec 0.56 0.64 0.57 -1.46 -0.33 1.13 
Pavitt 1 0.50 0.65 0.53 -2.73a -0.93 -1.16 
Pavitt 2 0.18 0.13 0.19 1.02 -0.5 -1.16 
Pavitt 3 0.28 0.16 0.23 2.52a 1.68 -1.48 
Pavitt 4 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.75 -0.49 0.38 
Centre-
north area 0.84 0.86 0.83 -0.53 0.68 -0.80 
Southern 
area 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.53 -0.68 0.80 
a significance at the 1 % level; b significance at the 5 % level; c sig-
nificance at the 10  % level. 
 
To briefly summing up the other results of table 
3, it appears that on average, younger firms, with 
lower innovation and higher financial constraints 
appear to have experienced significantly higher 
failure risks with respect to not failing firms dur-
ing the crisis. Besides, firms failed over the crisis 
compared with those failed before it, show a sig-
nificantly higher size and debt with banks and a 
lower solvency. However, in the next section we 
turn to a conditional analysis of firms’ failure to 
check for the exit determinants related to global 
engagement holding all the other factor constants. 
4. Econometric Methodology and Results 
4.1. Estimates of the exit rates: the model 
In this study we model the effects of international 
production variables and exporting activity on the 
probability of firm survival and we try to estimate 
if being globally engaged allows firms to react 
differently to the severity of the economic crisis 
compared to other firms.  
So, we first build a firm exit variable for 2002-
2007 which is equal to 0 if a firm is active over the 
NEW ASPECTS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
EXPERIENCE IN ITALY 
316 
whole period and 1 otherwise (pre-crisis exit). 
Then, we consider firms which exited over 2008-
2010 and we build an exit variable which is equal 
to 0 if a firm is active in that period and 1 other-
wise (exit over the crisis). Hence, we estimate the 
probability of failure of a firm (exit dummies) be-
fore 2008 and during the crisis (2008-2010) as a 
function of firm international engagement, control-
ling for a wide set of firms’ and sector characteris-
tics taken at the beginning of the period in which 
the failure occurred. With this analysis we may 
also check whether some firm characteristics 
played a different impact on exit before and during 
the crisis, respectively.  
In line with the literature (e.g., Greenaway 
et al. 2008; Zingales 1998) we use a maximum 
likelihood probit model of the firm's survival pro-
spects based on a range of relevant variables. 
We observe the company status variable (yit), 
which is either failure (yi = 1) or survival (yi = 0), 
but we define the dependent variable as a latent 
variable y*, the underlying response variable, 
which is the probability of failure as a function of 
the vector of the determinants of failure: 
 *1 0,i iy if y= >  (1) 
 *0 0.i iy if y= =  (2) 
The response variable y* is defined by the fol-
lowing regression relationship, in which y is exit in 
2002-2008 or exit in 2008-2010, the x variables 
are taken at the beginning of the exit period (2003 
and 2007, respectively), the slope parameters are 
given by the vector β and εit is a normally distrib-
uted error term.  
 *i i t it s ity a a x= + + β + δ + ε , (3) 
where 2(0, )it Nε σ . 
The probability that a firm fails (yi=1) there-
fore can be written as: 
 *Pr( 1) Pr( 0)it ity y= = >  (4) 
 'Pr( 1) Pr( 0)it it it i ty x a a= = β + ε + + >  (5) 
 
'
Pr( 1) Pr( )it itit i t
xy a aε β= = + + > −
σ σ
 (6) 
Given that it
ε
σ
 follows a standard normal distribu-
tion (mean zero and variance of one) and the pro-
bit distribution is symmetric, the probability of 
failure can be evaluated using the standard normal 
distribution function, Φ( ). 
 
'
Pr( 1) Pr( )it itit i t
xy a aε β= = + + < −
σ σ
 (7) 
 
'
Pr( 1) itit
xy
 β
= = Φ 
σ 
 (8) 
The main variables of interests are the three 
internationalisation dummies: 1) the firm exports 
or not; 2) the firm is an affiliates or not; 3) the firm 
invests abroad or not. The control variables are 
firm’s size, age, productivity and firm’s financing 
characteristics such as profit margin and indicators 
of liquidity and leverage (leverage, solvency ratio, 
collateral ratio) (see table 2 for the definition of 
these variables and expected signs).  
Furthermore, we include variables for national 
specialisation, a location dummy and a set of sec-
toral (2-digit Ateco 91) dummies (δs) to control for 
differences in regional economic growth and sec-
tor specific changes. 
4.2. Results of the Probit estimates  
Tables 4 and 5 provide the estimation results. The 
estimated coefficients from a Probit model cannot 
be used for statements about the size of the effect 
of a change of the value of an exogenous variable 
on the value of the endogenous variable (the prob-
ability of exit), because the size of this effect de-
pends on both the value of the exogenous variable 
under consideration and on the values of all the 
other variables in the model. Therefore, in order to 
provide some interpretation of the estimated coef-
ficients we also report the marginal changes, 
evaluated at the sample means for each independ-
ent variable. For a continuous variable the mar-
ginal effects show the increase in the predicted 
probability when there is a one-unit increase in the 
covariate, when the values of all variables in the 
model are at the mean of the sample used for the 
estimation of the model. The marginal effect asso-
ciated with a dummy tells us the change in the 
predicted probability of failure when the variable 
changes from zero to one (and when the values of 
all the other exogenous variables in the model are 
fixed at the sample mean). 
Focusing on firm internationalisation activities 
via exports, we observe that, both before and after 
the shock, exporters are significantly more likely 
to experience reduced exit probabilities, which in 
terms of the marginal effect, all else held constant, 
implies a much lower probability of failure for 
exporting firms: by 2.7 percentage points lower 
over the pre-crisis period, and by 4.1 over the cri-
sis period. Conversely, the affiliates of a foreign 
firm do not appear to have a significantly lower 
failure risk. We also find that Italian multination-
als investing abroad during the crisis exhibit 
higher exit risk while they do not experience lower 
exit probabilities than domestic firms over the pre-
crisis period. 
Looking at the control variables, our results 
show that larger and older firms, before the crisis 
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shock, are significantly more likely to experience 
lower exit, controlling for other firm and industry 
characteristics. A 1 % increase in the number of 
employees reduces the firm’s probability of failure 
by 0.3 percentage points, holding all the other fac-
tors constant. This marginal impact need to be 
compared with the predicted probability of exit, 
evaluated at the mean of the independent vari-
ables, which is 0.8. Therefore, a marginal impact 
of 0.3 percentage points implies a reduction in the 
predicted exit probability by 37.5 % (0.3/0.8). 
Firm age also returns negative coefficients with a 
significant impact on failure for the group of firms 
failing before the crisis. The marginal effect of 0.7 
percentage points implies a reduction in the pre-
dicted exit probability by 87 % (0.7/0.8). How-
ever, over the crisis larger and older firms have not 
benefited of higher chances of survival. These re-
sults are in contrast with studies showing the rele-
vance of size and age for survival (Dunne et al. 
1989; Mata and Portugal 1994 to quote the mile-
stone studies), but in line with other studies such 
as Audretsch et al. (2000) and Wagner (1994), and 
more recent  studies on firms financial default and 
size (Bottazzi et al. 2011a; Bottazzi et al. 2011b ), 
which find no clear-cut nexus between size and the 
probability of survival.  
Productivity shows a more consistent sign and 
significance: it reduces the risk of failure both be-
fore and over the crisis period. In both cases the 
marginal effect is quite high (0.7 and 0.6), which 
translates into a reduction of failure probabilities 
by 87 % before the crisis. 
Moving to the role of external finance we ob-
serve different results across the two periods: firms 
exiting over 2004-2008 are not significantly af-
fected by financial constraints. In our estimates 
profit margin displays a not significant association 
with the probability of failure, a result we get also 
in the crisis period, differently from the results 
shown in Bunn and Redwood (2003) and in 
Bridges and Guariglia (2008) for UK. 
However, while collateral, solvency and debts 
with banks were not significant determinants of 
firm failure before the crisis, firms failing over the 
crisis had lower collateral and solvency ratios and 
higher indebtedness with banks, which suggests 
that liquidity constraints turned out to affect posi-
tively the likelihood of failure over these years due 
to more serious financial tights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Probit model: the likelihood of exit before the 
crisis  
 Firm exit pre-crisis 
 Coefficient Marginal effect 
Size 
-0.1431 -0.0033 
(-2.65)a 
Age 
-0.3185 -0.0073 
(-3.90)a 
Prod 
-0.302 -0.0069 
(-3.09)a 
Export 
-1.0059 -0.0276 
(-5.96)a 
Inwfdi 
0.2256 0.0067 
(0.68) 
Outfdi 
0.2458 0.0073 
(0.97) 
Collateral 
-0.0239 -0.0005 
(-0.10) 
Profit 
0.0031 0.0001 
(1.04) 
Solvency  
-0.0029 -0.0001 
(-0.82) 
Debts banks  
-0.000 -0.0001 
(-0.00) 
Spec 
0.248 0.0055 
(1.54) 
RD 
0.477 0.011 
(0.25) 
Pavitt 1 
0.2186 0.0051 
(0.44) 
Pavitt 3 
0.0527 0.0012 
(0.10) 
Pavitt  4 
0.7114 0.0352 
(1.00) 
South location dummy 
-0.3114 -0.0057 
(-1.98)b 
Industry 317ummie (2 digit Ateco) Yes 
Number of observations 2563 
Log likelihood -233.11 
Pseudo R2 0.17 
Pred. P (at x bar) 0.008 
a significance at the 1 % level; b significance at the 5 % level; c 
significance at the 10 % level. 
 
Innovation of firms, measured by R&D over turn-
over, turns out to be a weakly significant factor of 
risk failure, however, belonging to a high technol-
ogy sector (according to Pavitt taxonomy) is a sig-
nificant determinant of lower exit over the crisis 
(1.65 percentage points lower) with respect to 
firms belonging to the reference category (special-
ised suppliers). 
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Table 5. Probit model: the likelihood of exit during the 
crisis  
  Firm exit during the crisis 
  Coefficient Marginal effect 
Size 
-0.0663 -0.001 
(-1.22) 
Age 
0.088 0.0013 
(0.73) 
Prod 
-0.383 -0.0058 
(-4.21)a 
Export 
-1.535 -0.0407 
(-8.46)a 
Inwfdi 
0.0359 0.0006 
(0.12) 
Outfdi 
0.7219 0.0262 
(3.18)a 
Collateral 
-0.4115 -0.0063 
(-1.83)c 
Profit  
0.0017 0 
(0.69) 
Solvency  
-0.0069 -0.0001 
(-1.84)* 
Debts banks  
0.0069 0.0001 
(2.74)a 
Spec 
0.0591 0.0009 
(0.40) 
RD 
-2.3882 -0.0365 
(-1.23) 
Pavitt 1 
0.4372 0.0073 
(0.85) 
Pavitt 3 
-0.1883 -0.0027 
(-0.46) 
Pavitt  4 
-3.2184 -0.0099 
(-5.15)a 
South location dummy 
0.0206 0.0003 
(0.13) 
Industry dummies (2 digit Ateco) Yes 
Number of observations 2441 
Log likelihood -275.0667 
Pseudo R2 0.29 
Pred. P (at x bar) 0.005 
a significance at the 1 % level; b significance at the 5 % level; c sig-
nificance at the  10 % level. 
5. Conclusions 
Authors of current paper looked at the recent crisis 
highlighting the influence of internationalisation 
on firm survival in Italy, controlling for the role of 
several firms characteristics (size, age, productiv-
ity, financial health and innovation) and industry 
variables (specialisation, Pavitt classes).  
To sum up, the results reveal the higher 
chances of survival for firms which export over 
the crisis, while uncovering the higher risk of fail-
ure faced by Italian firms investing abroad. How-
ever, foreign owned firms do not experience lower 
failure risk than domestic firms. 
Firm financial profile also showed up as quite 
relevant for firm exit. In particular, lower collateral 
and solvency and higher debt towards banks over 
turnover had a positive and highly significant asso-
ciation with the probability of firm exit, which was 
not observed before the crisis. Our results also sug-
gest that during the crisis small firms were not more 
at risk of exiting with respect to larger firms, after 
controlling for their performance in terms of ex-
ports, collateral guarantees and bank indebtedness.  
To conclude, the findings for Italy and for our 
sample are not consistent with the idea that for-
eign multinational firms are more affected by an 
economic crisis and that they are more volatile 
than domestic firms in these circumstances. On the 
other hand, we do not get evidence neither that 
they are able to act as stabilizers, as some litera-
ture has shown (Desai et al. 2008; Blalock 2008; 
Tong, Wei 2010; Alfaro, Chen 2011). Finally, it 
has quite relevant policy implications the fact that 
exporting firms have experienced reduced exit 
probabilities both before and after the shock and 
that domestic multinationals have been more likely 
to exit over the crisis. 
However, much more research is needed on 
the heterogeneous response of multinationals en-
terprises and of their affiliates to the impact of a 
crisis. Multinationals behaviour is influenced by a 
complex network of relationships. Therefore, re-
sponses of firms to changes in their domestic and 
international environment are not only a function 
of firm characteristics but also depend on complex 
ties and international linkages. The affiliates’ posi-
tion in the MNEs’ network, the country of origin 
of investors and the investment motivations may 
indeed determine different outcome. 
Further research should point to look for data 
which allow a disaggregation of the chain of rela-
tionships, both productive and financial, behind 
the multinationals’ responses. Besides, as men-
tioned above, more research is needed on the be-
haviour of exporters in a crisis.  
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